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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XVIII
SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY LIABILITY OF CIGARETTE
MANUFACTURERS
The plaintiffs' decedent instituted an action against the defendant
and alleged that he had contracted lung cancer as a result of smoking
cigarettes manufactured by the defendant.' Subsequent to the decedent's
death, his administrator was substituted as the plaintiff.' The jury ren-
dered a general verdict for the defendant,8 upon which judgment was
entered. The instructions from the court were that under Florida law,
liability under an implied warranty of wholesomeness of products sold
in their original package does not extend to those situations wherein
the manufacturer had neither knowledge nor the opportunity to acquire
knowledge, of harmful substances in the product.4 On appeal, 5 the
1. The plaintiff claimed that he had smoked the defendant's product, Lucky Strike
cigarettes, since 1924 or 1925, and that he had smoked from one to three packages of dga-
rettes a day until 1956 when his physician advised him that he had lung cancer. By this
time, the cancer had become incurable. The plaintiff died approximately 2 years after the
diagnosis, his death occurring 3 months after he had instituted the present suit.
2. Pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 45.11 (1961), the decedent's claim survived and was prose-
cuted by his administrator who, in accordance with FED. R. Civ. P. 25(a), was substituted
as plaintiff. The decedent's widow filed suit pursuant to FLA. STAT. §§ 768.01 & 768.02 (1961),
the Florida Wrongful Death statute. The two suits were consolidated for trial.
3. The jury also answered the following written interrogatories which were submitted
to them under authority of FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b):
(1) Did the decedent Green have primary cancer in his left lung?
Yes X
No
If your answer is "yes," then
(2) Was the cancer in his left lung the cause or one of the causes of his death?
Yes X
No
If your answer to the above question is "yes" then
(3) Was the smoking of Lucky Strike cigarettes on the part of the decedent, Green,
a proximate cause or one of the proximate. causes of the development of
cancer in his left lung?
Yes X
No
If your answer to the above question is "yes," then
(4) Could the defendant on, or prior to, February 1, 1956, by the reasonable appli-
cation of human skill and foresight have known that users of Lucky Strike
cigarettes, such as the decedent, Green, would be endangered, by the inhala-
tion of the main stream smoke from Lucky Strike cigarettes, of contracting
cancer of the lung?
Yes
No X
4. The court instructed the jury, in part, that:
The manufacture of products which are offered for sale to the public in their origi-
nal package for human consumption . . . impliedly warrants that its products are
reasonably wholesome or fit for the purpose for which they are sold, but such im-
plied warranty does not cover substances in the manufactured product, the harmful
effects of which no developed skill or foresight can afford knowledge. Record,
Green v. American Tobacco Co. (S.D. Fla. 1958).
The court refused to instruct the jury as requested by the plaintiff that when a manu-
facturer sells a product in its original package for human consumption and the product
contains a latent defect which renders the product unsuitable for the use intended or danger-
ous to the health of the user, the manufacturer will be liable for the injury caused by the
defect whether or not the manufacturer knew of the latent danger.
5. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
CASES NOTED
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the de-
cision of the district court on the ground that Florida law does not hold
a manufacturer liable "as an absolute insurer against consequences of
which no developed human skill and foresight could afford knowledge."'
The court of appeals granted a rehearing to the extent necessary to
certify to the Supreme Court of Florida7 a question concerning the liabil-
ity of cigarette manufacturers under the doctrine of implied warranty.'
In response to the certified question, the supreme court held: in Florida,
implied warranty liability will be imposed upon the manufacturer of a
defective or unwholesome product irrespective of his knowledge of the
product's condition. 9 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 169
(Fla. 1963).
In the sale of foods'" or other products for human consumption or
intimate bodily use," there arises an implied warranty that the article
is wholesome or fit for its purpose. Approximately one-half of the Amer-
ican jurisdictions, either by case law or statute, impose strict liability
for injuries resulting from food or drink sold in a defective condition.' 2
6. Id. at 76.
7. FLA. STAT. § 25.031 (1961); FLA. R. App. P. 4.61 (1962). See note 42 infra.
8. The certified question was as follows:
Does the law of Florida impose on a manufacturer and distributor of cigarettes
absolute liability, as for breach of implied warranty, for death caused by using
such cigarettes from 1924 or 1925 until February 1, 1956, the cancer having devel-
oped prior to February 1, 1956, and the death occurring February 25, 1958, when
the defendant manufacturer and distributor could not on, or prior to, February 1,
1956, by the reasonable application of human skill and foresight, have known that
users of such cigarettes would be endangered by the inhalation of the main stream
smoke from such cigarettes, of contracting cancer of the lung? Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1963).
9. "[A] manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge or opportunity for knowledge of
a defective or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant to his liability on the theory of
implied warranty. . . ." Green v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 8, at 170.
10. 77 C.J.S. Sales § 331 (1952).
11. The RESTATEMENT (SEcONo), TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962), reflects the
trend toward expanding the scope of manufacturer's liability. The Restatement includes in
its classification of products for "intimate bodily use" products intended for internal human
consumption or "application or contact with the body, when the application or contact is
of an 'intimate' character," and specifically mentions cigarettes. Section 402A applies only
when the product's defective condition makes it unreasonably dangerous. The Restatement
provides that "good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of
smoking may be harmful . . . ." Id. at 5.
12. See Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 7 (1961). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS, note 11
supra, has formulated the following rule relating to products liability:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Sellers of Products for Intimate Bodily Use
One engaged in the business of selling food for human consumption or other
products for intimate bodily use, who sells such a product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the consumer, is subject to liability for bodily harm
thereby caused to one who consumes it, even though
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
the product, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
The Restatement lists 19 states which by case law impose strict liability in food and
drink cases and 5 states which have statutes to the same effect.
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The rationale supporting the Florida rule of strict liability"3 was
clearly set forth by the supreme court in Blanton v. Cudahy Packing
Co.,'4 wherein a manufacturer and canner of a defective meat product
was held liable for breach of warranty:
The manufacturer knows the content and quality of the food
products canned and offered to the public for consumption.
The public generally is vitally concerned in wholesome food,
or its health will be jeopardized. If poisonous, unhealthful and
deleterious foods are placed by the manufacturer upon the
market and injuries occur by the consumption thereof then the
law should supply the injured person an adequate and speedy
remedy.
15
This rationale was subsequently applied in a case in which a restau-
ranteur was held liable for breach of an implied warranty of wholesome-
ness."6 The court noted that as between the restauranteur and the
consumer, the former was in the better position to determine and con-
trol, through the use of his facilities, the quality of the food served. Fol-
lowing these two cases, the supreme court held retail dealers liable on
the theory of implied warranty when they sold canned goods containing
deleterious substances which rendered the foods unfit for human con-
sumption." These cases concerning consumable products marked an
unmistakable trend leading to the conclusion that as between the con-
sumer and the party responsible for placing the article on the market,
only the latter is in the position to prevent injuries which are caused by
unwholesome products.'8 Consequently, the strict liability which had
been imposed was not dependent upon the vendor's knowledge, actual
or implied, of a defective condition.' 9 Quite the contrary, as the court
had clearly pointed out, knowledge was not a prerequisite to liability:
13. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
14. 154 Fla. 872, 19 So.2d 313 (1944).
15. Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 876-77, 19 So.2d 313, 316 (1944).
See also Miami Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Todd, 101 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1958); Hoskins v.
Jackson Grain Co., 63 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1953); Florida Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan,
62 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1953); Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Shaw, 118 So.2d 840 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1960).
16. Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1949).
17. Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Macurda, 93 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1957) (worms in a can of
spinach) ; Sencer v. Carl's Markets, Inc., 45 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1950) (sardines contained
foreign matter).
18. In addition to the manufacturer's or seller's ability to prevent injuries, the court
has noted other factors which require these parties to bear the risk of loss. E.g., Cliett v.
Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1949) (express or implied assurance of
wholesomeness as advertised); Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So.2d 313
(1944) (liability should depend not upon the intricacies of the law of sales and privity but
upon right, justice and welfare of the general purchasing and consuming public).
19. "Whether it be tort or contract, a breach of warranty gives rise, to strict liability
which does not depend upon any knowledge of defects on the part of the seller, or any
negligence." PROSSER, TORTS § 83, at 494 (2d ed. 1955). See 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 242 (rev.
ed. 1948).
1963] CASES NOTED
The ultimate holding of the court of appeal is to the effect that
proof of actual or implied knowledge of a defect on the part of
a retailer is essential to his liability on an implied warranty....
Here again we think its confidence was misplaced. .. 20
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court placed cigarettes
in the food and consumable products classification. As a result, Florida
became the first jurisdiction to impose strict warranty liability on cig-
arette manufacturers for cancer proximately caused by smoking.2' How-
ever, earlier cases in other jurisdictions had already indicated that man-
ufacturers might be held liable under any of several theories.
In the widely publicized case of Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co.,22 the plaintiff alleged, in essence, that the defendant had
been negligent in its failure to warn of the deleterious substances present
in its product and that the defendant had breached an implied warranty
of wholesomeness.2" The Third Circuit, in reversing the lower court, held
that it was for the jury to determine whether the defendant had breached
a warranty of merchantability and whether it was negligent in not prop-
erly testing its product to determine its harmful effects. 4 The apparently
20. Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So.2d 390, 392 (Fla. 1961), affirming 122 So.2d
22 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960). Although the quoted statement was a dictum, the court's position
on the question of knowledge was not to be doubted. As noted by the court in the Green
case, since liability had been imposed on retailers of canned goods when practically speaking,
there was no opportunity to acquire knowledge of the defect, knowledge could not be
deemed essential to liability. Further, in Smith v. Burdines, Inc., note 11 supra, the court,
by necessary implication, did not consider knowledge of the defect as a requisite of liability.
The plaintiff had purchased lipstick containing a poisonous substance. The retailer did not
know, nor could not have known, of the dangerous chemical in the product. While the
decision was based upon the fact that the plaintiff had relied on the vendor's skill and
judgment in recommending the product for a particular use, the fact remains that the
vendor had no knowledge of the deleterious substance and yet, implied warranty liability
was imposed.
21. No attempt has been made in this note to discuss the problem of establishing the
causal connection between smoking and cancer. As stated in note 3 supra, the jury in the
instant case found that the causal connection had been established. For a general discussion
of the medical aspect of the cigarette cancer problem, see Burgess, Lung Cancer Liability
of Cigarette Manufacturers, 2 TORT & MEDICAL YEARBOOK 166 (1962); Hastings, "We the
Jury, Find: Cigarettes Cause Cancer"--A Products Liability Challenge, 1 TORT & MEDICAL
YEARBOOK 213 (1962). See also Boshkoff, Some Thoughts About Physical Harm, Disclaimers
and Warranties, 4 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 285 (1963) for a consideration of the relation-
ship between the smoking and cancer problem and implied warranty.
22. 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), reversing 134 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Pa. 1955) (plaintiff
claimed that he had smoked cigarettes from 1921 to 1953).
23. The court stated that in addition to this warranty, an action might lie for breach
of a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. However, in this case, the two warranties
would seem to be co-extensive. See 1 WILLIsTON, SALES § 235 (rev. ed. 1948).
24. Defendant claimed that it had conducted tests in 1952 to determine the effects of
smoking on the nose, throat and accessory organs. However, the court stated that there was
evidence to support the contention that these tests were inconclusive and inadequate to
support claims that smoking was harmless.
For a discussion of several cigarette cancer cases, see FREEDMAN, ALLERGY & PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 66 (1961). See also R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hudson, 314 F.2d 776 (5th
Cir. 1963); Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co., 183 F. Supp. 406 (M.D. Pa. 1960), both of
which deal with the problem of when the statute of limitations forecloses an action for
cancer caused by smoking.
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unyielding position taken in the Green decision was not present in
Pritchard for several reasons. First, the court said that the jury could
be instructed to consider the practices of other cigarette manufacturers
in determining merchantability. 5 Second, in Pritchard, the plaintiff in-
troduced advertisements for the defendant's cigarettes which not only
extolled the pleasures to be derived from smoking, but which could also
be reasonably interpreted as expressly assuring a consumer that no
harm would befall him as a result of smoking.
2 6
Another case which indicated that warranty liability might be im-
posed upon cigarette manufacturers was Ross v. Philip Morris Co.27
The Missouri district court had granted the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that Missouri law required privity in order
for warranty liability to be imposed. A subsequent Missouri Supreme
Court decision 29 stated in a dictum that in cases involving products for
human consumption, privity was not essential to liability on a warranty
of merchantability or wholesomeness. On the strength of this opinion,
the district court vacated its former opinion and denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment.80
Other courts have refused to impose liability on cigarette manu-
facturers. In Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,81 the plaintiff's
complaint attempted to set forth an action in deceit. However, the ad-
vertisements upon which the plaintiff claimed to have relied, were not
those which were published by the defendant, 2 and therefore, the
plaintiff failed to sustain her burden.
Cases dealing with government action concerning the contents of cigarettes are R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FTC, 192 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1951); United States v. 46 Cartons,
113 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1953); FTC v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 108 F. Supp. 573
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
25. The court in the Pritchard case pointed out, as did the Florida Supreme Court in
the Green case, that this evidence could not be conclusive of merchantability or fitness, but
the Green case seemed to foreclose any consideration of this evidence.
26. Some of the advertisements made by defendant were: "'A good cigarette can cause
no ills and cure no ailments . . . but it gives you a lot of pleasure, peace of mind and
comfort .... ' 'Nose, throat and accessory organs not adversely affected by smoking Chester-
fields.'" Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 296-97 (3d Cir. 1961).
The court stated that the evidence indicated an express warranty by the defendant that
there would be no harmful effects on the lungs.
27. Memorandum opinion No. 9494, U.S. Dist. Ct. (W.D. Mo.) Oct. 22, 1959, reproduced
in Anderson, Observations on the Law of Implied Warranty of Quality in Missouri: 1960,
1960 WAsH. U.L.Q. 71, 74-75.
28. Ross v. Philip Morris Co., 164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
29. Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959).
30. Subsequently, on July 10, 1962, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant
tobacco company on the issues of implied warranty and negligence. Judgment was entered
on the verdict and also on the defendant's motion for summary judgment with regard to
the plaintiff's count for fraud and deceit which the court had previously sustained.
31. 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1958), affirming 158 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1957). The
plaintiff also alleged a breach of warranty by the defendant, but because Massachusetts
law did not recognize this action in the absence of privity, the count was stricken from
the complaint. See also 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956).
32. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's advertisements, upon
1963] CASES NOTED
Lartigue v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co."3 was decided by the
Fifth Circuit on the ground that although Louisiana law imposed strict
liability on manufacturers of defective food products, and even conceding
that cigarettes are in this classification, this liability would be imposed
only when the harm resulting from the defect was a foreseeable con-
sequence. 4 This decision, however, can afford cigarette manufacturers
little in the way of refuge from the apparent trend toward strict liability.
The court of appeals noted policy reasons which required the imposition
of liability upon manufacturers as a cost of production.85 Of greater
significance, however, is the fact that the entire opinion was, of necessity,
couched in terms of the manufacturer's inability to foresee the harm
resulting from its product based upon a lack of medical knowledge as
to the harmful effects of smoking. 6 Medical research has recently
suggested, if not established, the causal connection between smoking and
cancer and in the future, foreseeablility might not insulate manufacturers
from liability even under this limited theory of strict liability."
A disturbing aspect of the Green case is that the court did not
pass upon the question of whether cigarettes are unmerchantable as a
matter of law. Although they would seem to be merchantable under
prevailing definitions of the word,"8 the court imposed strict liability
which the plaintiff's decedent supposedly relied, stated that "20,000 doctors say that
Camel cigarettes are healthful" and "Camel cigarettes are harmless to the respiratory system."
The defendant produced evidence, which was not refuted, that its advertisements in fact
stated that "more doctors smoke Camels than any other cigarette" and that Camels will
"agree with your throat." Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 158 F. Supp. 22, 24-25
(D. Mass. 1957).
33. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
34. The court pointed out that under this limited application of strict liability, it was
not necessary to establish that the defendant had knowledge of the defective condition or
that it failed to use due care, but it was necessary to establish that predicated upon existing
knowledge, the product contained a substance from which the harm might be expected
to flow.
35. As a matter of public policy, the court said that the risk of injuries caused by
defective foods is an incident of doing business and that since the consumer is unable to
protect himself from these defects, the producer must bear the responsibility. But as a matter
of policy from the manufacturer's point of view, the court held that Louisiana implied
warranty liability does not include harm resulting from "unknowable" risks.
36. "At this point, it cannot be said that cigarette smokers who started smoking before
the great cancer-smoking debate relied on the tobacco companies' 'warranty' that their
cigarettes had no carcinogenic element. Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d
19, 39-40 (5th Cir. 1963). (Emphasis added.)
37. See note 34 supra.
38. 77 C.J.S. Sales § 183 (1952) (of a quality such as is generally sold in the market
and suitable for the purpose for which it was intended); 46 Am. JUR. Sales § 149 (1943)
(such as is usually sold in the market; or, medium quality). See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-314.
The court cited, with apparent approval, a statement made by Dean Prosser that "'goods
are merchantable only if they are fit for ordinary use.'" Green v. American Tobacco Co.,
154 So.2d 169, 173 (Fla. 1963), citing Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable
Quality, 27 MmrN. L. Rv. 117, 168 (1943).
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irrespective of the traditional concept of merchantability. "9 In previous
food cases,4" strict liability was imposed in cases of defective products,
defective in relation to products which are ordinarily placed on the
market.4 In the instant case, liability was imposed for harm caused
by cigarettes which were apparently on a par with all cigarettes. There-
for, the inescapable conclusion is that under Florida law, cigarette
manufacturers are insurers of their product irrespective of their inability
to alter the product's composition and still retain its identity, and without
regard to the public's awareness of the effects of smoking. Further, it
is questionable whether the policy which supports strict liability in cases
of food products supports the same liability in cigarette cases.42
The upshot of the few cases which have considered the cigarette
caneer problem ig that the courts are faced with an area having enormous
ramifications. On one hand, a plaintiff whose body has been infected
with a dread disease is seeking his remedy in the courts, claiming that
cigarettes caused his condition. On the other hand, as a matter of eco-
nomics, more decisions like the instant case could well spell the annihila-
tion of the tobacco industry.
It is submitted that the decision in the Green case extended the
application of implied warranty liability to a factual situation beyond
the scope of the underlying basis of the doctrine. As the Florida Supreme
Court and leading authorities in the field of warranty have stated, in
cases involving food products which are essential to the public health, the
ultimate consumer, who is unaware of a defect in the product against
which he is unable to protect himself, should be afforded every possible
protection. It is the writer's opinion that this rationale need not be
applied to cigarettes, a product the characteristics of which the public
is aware, and which obviously is neither essential to the public health
39. The imposition of strict liability precludes consideration of industry standards which
have been considered an integral component of the concept of merchantability. See note 25
supra and accompanying text.
40. See notes 14 through 18 supra and accompanying text.
41. In Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (con-
curring opinion), Judge Goodrich, although concurring in the result reached by the majority
of the court that the case should be remanded for another trial, made the following
statement:
If a man buys whiskey and drinks too much of it and gets some liver trouble as a
result I do not think the manufacturer is liable unless (1) the manufacturer tells the
customer the whiskey will not hurt him or (2) the whiskey is adulterated-made
with methyl alcohol, for instance. The same surely is true of one who churns and
sells butter to a customer who should be on a nonfat diet. The same is true, like-
wise, as to one who roasts and sells salted peanuts to a customer who should be on
a no-salt diet. Surely if the butter and the peanuts are pure there is no liability
if the cholesterol count rises dangerously. Id. at 302.
In this case, there was no claim that Chesterfields were not made of commercially satisfactory
tobacco.
42. See Anderson, Observations on the Law of Implied Warranty of Quality in Missouri:
1960, 1960 WAsH. U.L.Q. 71.
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nor a necessity in any sense of the word, notwithstanding its addictive
nature or the "powers of commercial persuasion."4
BARRY N. SEMET
43. Upon receipt of the answer to the question certified by it to the Florida Supreme
Court, the Fifth Circuit heard the case for the second time and reversed the prior judgments
and remanded the case for a new trial on the issues of liability and damages. Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963). The court of appeals predicated its
action on the Florida Supreme Court's statement that it need not pass upon the "scope
and breach of the implied warranty that a product supplied for human consumption shall be
reasonably jit and wholesome for that general purpose." Green v. American Tobacco Co.,
154 So.2d 169, 171 (Fla. 1963). (Emphasis added.) Since the jury had not determined
whether or not the cigarettes were "reasonably fit or wholesome," and since the majority
of the court of appeals concluded that this concept of reasonable fitness limited the scope
of the defendant's warranty, a jury determination of this issue was essential to liability.
There are, however, two factors which lead to the contrary conclusion. First, as stated
in the dissenting opinion, the Florida Supreme Court answered in the affirmative the cer-
tified question of whether absolute liability would be imposed upon cigarette manufacturers
for cancer caused by their products. Since the majority opinion stated that the parties were
bound by the jury's responses to the first three interrogatories, note 3 supra, which in-
cluded the finding that the defendant's cigarettes were a proximate cause of the decedent's
lung cancer, this, in conjunction with the answer to the certified question, should have
been sufficient for the court of appeals to render judgment for the plaintiff on the issue
of liability and remand the case solely for a determination of damages. Second, the follow-
ing statement made by the Florida Supreme Court dispels the conclusion that the scope of
liability is determined by reasonable fitness:
The contention that wholesomeness of a product should be determined on any
standard other than actual safety for human consumption, when supplied for that
purpose, is a novel proposition in our law, and one which we are persuaded has
no foundation in the decided cases. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 169,
173 (Fla. 1963). (Emphasis added.)
Although this statement was made in reference to industry standards as a basis for deter-
mining fitness for consumption, its clear import, as well as that of the entire opinion, is
that absolute liability will be imposed if the cigarettes caused the cancer.
